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Ifnames are not correct, then language is not in accord 
with the truth of things. If language is not in accord with 
the truth of things, then affairs cannot be carried out 
successfully. -- Confucius 
Abstract. 	Markets are much in vogue as ideal 
institutions for managing water both nationally and 
internationally. Markets are presented as functioning 
automatically and nearly painlessly. True markets, 
however, have seldom existed for water rights and there are 
good reasons for believing that they seldom will. Water is 
an ambient resource where the actions of any one user 
necessarily affect many other users. It is, in fact, no 
accident that water metaphors have long been used by 
economists to describe situations where markets fail: 
"common pool resources"; "spill over effects"; etc. Thus, 
if true markets are to be relied on to allocate for particular 
uses and distribute water among users, the transaction costs 
of organizing contracts with all holders of water rights (let 
alone those holding less formal claims affected by a sale or 
lease) generally have been and will be prohibitive. Water, 
in short, is the quintessential public good for which markets 
simply do not work. 
DO NAMES MAF1ER? 
Confucius was onto something—even if his point that 
using names correctly is central to a successful ordering of 
society is not self-evident to many speaking and writing 
today. His point is particularly important in the legal 
profession that all too often richly rewards members who 
succeed in obfuscating names and meanings. In this paper, 
I address one particular name much in vogue around the 
globe since the end of Communism and the virtual demise 
of socialism—the word "market." (Yergin & Stanislaw) I 
address the use of this word as applied to a particular 
context—namely the now fashionable claim that markets 
for water will provide a nearly painless means for resolving 
problems of water allocation, distribution, and 
preservation. (Anderson & Hill; Anderson & Snyder; Israel 
& Lund; Kaiser; Kaiser & Phillips; Symposium; 
Thompson) Most alarming about this fashion is the misuse 
of the name "market." (Dellapenna 2000b) 
Of course, water in relatively small quantities can easily 
be bought or sold. Raw water in bulk—rivers, lakes, 
aquifers, and the like—are another matter. Certain 
questions in connection therewith have been made more 
difficult to assess by misuse of the name "market" to 
describe certain situations that simply are not markets. I am 
not opposed to markets on principle. I have lived in a 
Communist command economy for a year—in a remote 
corner of the People's Republic of China without the 
protections from local conditions that even then foreigners 
living in large cities like Beijing, Guangzhou, or Shanghai 
could expect. As a result, I fully appreciate the many 
virtues of a market economy. My concern is narrower than 
questions about the utility of markets generally. Simply put, 
all too often, the proponents of markets as water 
management tools confuse the administrative use of 
economic incentives for markets. Consider the following 
example. 
Bolivia is one of the poorest nations on the planet. Like 
many poor nations, it has had trouble providing water to its 
cities, its industries, and its farmers. In an effort to deal 
with the problem, the Bolivian government recently 
proposed to privatize the delivery of water, beginning in the 
city of Cochabamba, the country's third largest city. 
(Associated Press) The plan involved the construction of a 
new electricity and drinking water network by a consortium 
of American, Bolivian, British, Italian, and Spanish 
companies at a cost of $200,000,000. The project promised 
more reliable delivery of potable water, but would raise the 
cost of the water to the residents of the city and the 
surrounding countryside by 35 percent. The plan provoked 
such widespread public opposition—including roadblocks 
across highways in widely scattered regions and violent 
protests in which people on both sides died—that the 
consortium cancelled its project. 
The project might very well have been the best possible 
solution to the pressing needs for a safer and more certain 
water supply for Cochabamba. Places in the world were 
water delivery facilities do not recover their costs from 
their customers are place were water delivery facilities are 
under-funded, unreliable, and generally decrepit. 
Furthermore, making water users at least pay the cost of 
processing and delivering water is the easiest way, perhaps 
the only way, to make individual water users consider the 
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worth of the use relative to the cost of using the water. 
Only if they consider the cost of the water usage will 
individual water users make rational decisions regarding 
whether and how to use water. 
The problem is that the Bolivian proposal is very 
unlikely to produce anything like a real market—that is, a 
setting where water users will be able to negotiate over the 
price of water, users seeking out the least cost provider, 
providers seeking out the user willing to pay the highest 
price, and both otherwise engaging in the sorts of activities 
that give rise to the expectation that markets are likely to 
generate the "highest and best" or at least the most 
economically efficient use of water. The price of water in 
Cochabamba almost certainly would be set by the 
consortium, with or without governmental regulation. Who 
receives water at what price and for what purposes is an 
administrative decision that does not result from the play of 
market forces. 
Unfortunately, all too often economists and others will 
proclaim that proposals such as the now abandoned 
Cochabamba plan were markets. An excellent example of 
such misnaming is the California Water Bank to be 
discussed below. This matters because—particularly since 
the collapse of Communism and socialism on a global 
scale—we presume that the results reached in a market are 
"correct"—a presumption that we do not indulge for the 
outcomes of governmental or other non-market decisions. 
(Trelease 1974) After all, there are serious questions about 
whether experts at any administering agency can realisti-
cally be expected to acquire the necessary information ever 
to arrive at the right conclusions. The market, on the other 
hand, functions like a mammoth computational system that 
translates relevant information in common factors—dollars 
and cents—which can then be combined to tell us through 
a single figure—the price—the sum of all the variables that 
impact upon the price. No wonder many persons advocate 
markets not only for managing water, but for managing 
environmental problems generally. (Anderson & Leal) 
I fully accept that markets are the best tool we have for 
managing resources when markets work reasonably well, 
and I fully accept the presumption that the outcome of a set 
of market transactions are the best outcomes. But that 
presumption ought not to be accorded to the outcomes of 
administrative events masquerading as markets. (Blumm; 
Dempsey) To call an administrative system a market 
reduces, if it doesn't remove altogether, the sort of close, 
on-going scrutiny that the decision.properly deserves. Thus 
we must be very careful to use the name "market" 
accurately. Once we begin to use the label "market" 
accurately in water management contexts, perhaps the most 
striking point that we discover is that, as an empirical 
matter, actual markets in free-flowing water have always  
been extremely rare. Such markets as there are generally 
have been used to transfer fairly small quantities of water 
among similar users in close proximity to each other, such 
as between farmers or ranchers within a single irrigation or 
water management district. (Thompson at 708-23; Wahl 
1989, at 133-40; Young) The modern concern, however, is 
not with creating markets to facilitate such transactions, but 
to find ways to move large quantities of water out of 
existing uses into uses that were not developed at the time 
the water was first allocated to existing patterns of use. 
This generally means moving water out of agriculture in 
order to meet the needs of growing cities, new industries, or 
newly recognized environmental needs. (Anderson & 
Snyder; Israel & Lund; Kaiser, at 185-92; MacDonnell & 
Rice; Tarlock & Van de Wetering; Thompson; Wahl 1989, 
at 140-44; Weber 1990) Water markets in fact have 
seldom been used to accomplish such significant changes in 
the ways in which water is used even when there would be 
clear benefits to society from the transaction. (McCormick; 
Thompson, at 708-23; Wahl 1989, at 197-289) This poses 
the interesting, if all too obvious, question: If markets for 
water are so good, why are they so seldom used? 
WHY DO MARKETS FOR WATER FAIL? 
Markets are not natural phenomena. Markets are 
cultural artifacts created and structured by social 
arrangements that we term "law." To understand markets, 
how and why they operate, and when and how they fail, one 
must begin by examining the law that structures a 
particular market. Most fundamental to the functioning of 
markets are the laws that define the property rights that 
form the "objects" of a market's transactions. Yet the idea 
of owning water is not so self-evident as economists and 
others who advocate the utility of markets as water 
management tools assume. Such advocates typically do not 
address why markets are so seldom found or why there is 
so much resistance to applying market principles to water; 
instead, they are likely to denigrate critics of water markets 
as holding onto to cultural, religious, even mystical notions 
of the importance of water, resulting in arbitrary legal 
impediments to markets when water ought to be treated just 
like any other commodity. (Anderson & Snyder, at 17-29, 
114-16; Kaiser, at 247-50, 260; MacDonnell & Rice, at 
52; Wahl 1989, at 147-91; Young, at 1144-45,1149) This 
attitude ignores the most important features of water. 
People look upon water differently from other resources 
because water is more immediately essential to life than 
any other resource except air. Deprive us of air, and we die 
in minutes. Deprive us of water, and we die in days. 
Deprive us of food, and we can go on for weeks or months, 
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depending on our physical condition at the beginning of the 
fast—and on whether we have adequate supplies of water. 
And, as a Turkish businessman once commented, 
"Countless millions of people have lived without love, but 
none without water." Furthermore, water is an ambient 
resource that by its very nature is shared among users. 
Therefore, water cannot be owned in the usual senses of 
that word. This reality was caught in a famous aphosirm: 
"A river is more than an amenity, it is a treasure. It offers 
a necessity of life that must be rationed among those who 
have power over it." (New Jersey v. New York, at 342) 
Because of water's importance to human and other life 
and because of its ambient nature, water has long been 
considered to be the quintessential "public good." 
(Harbison; Williams) Economists are so accustomed to 
considering water as a paradigm of a public good that they 
customarily use water metaphors to discuss public goods 
generally: "common pool resource," "spill over effects," 
and so on. This fact alone should be enough to give even 
the most free-market oriented economists pause to consider 
whether true markets will function effectively for these 
resources. Yet water is not a public good in the narrowest 
sense of that term. Only the impossibility of setting up real 
markets for raw water in bulk demonstrates the wisdom of 
treating water as a public good. 
The Concept of a Public Good 
A "public good" is one that shares two qualities: 
indivisibility and publicness. (Kaul, Grunberg, & Stem) 
Indivisibility means that a good cannot be divided up 
among the consuming public, allowing some consumers 
access to the resource while excluding other potential 
consumers. Publicness means that the resource is shared 
freely (if not equally) among the group—consumption by 
one person does not, at least usually, interfere with 
consumption by others. Because the good is indivisible, one 
cannot simply divide it up and buy as much as one wants; 
because it is public, it is impossible to keep others from 
accessing and enjoying the good so long as it is accessible 
and enjoyable by anyone. In other words, all within the 
relevant public must enjoy the good more or less equally, 
or no one can enjoy it at all. 
Public goods generally are free goods as far as markets 
are concerned because consumers cannot (or cannot 
realistically) be excluded from enjoying the good. (Cowen) 
How much can one charge others for viewing the blue sky 
over one's property? The only costs, if any, associated with 
a public good are the costs of capture, transportation, and 
delivery, not a cost for the good itself. This means, 
however, that if you invest in developing or improving the 
good others who invest or pay nothing will enjoy the 
benefits of your investment because you cannot exclude 
those others from enjoying the good. (Coase 1974) Such 
others are known as "free riders" and are seen as a serious 
inhibition to investment unless some institution (like the 
government) takes responsibility for assuring that all or 
nearly all in fact pay for the benefits they receive. (Bac; 
Coase 1960) 
Air pollution is an excellent example. Automobile 
exhaust is a significant source of air pollution. If many 
people voluntarily invest in cleaner running cars in order to 
protect the air we breathe, I will have cleaner air just as 
much as they will. If I decide not to buy a cleaner running 
car, that decision by itself will not greatly affect the quality 
of the air we all breathe. I can (and many would) decide to 
become "free riders" on the efforts of others to clean the 
air. As more people realize that this possibility exists, 
fewer would voluntarily buy a cleaner running car. Under 
these circumstances, all or nearly all simply will not buy 
cleaner running cars voluntarily. The solution, of course, is 
to compel all to buy cleaner running cars. Relying on the 
market simply won't work; relying on regulation will. 
Water as a Public Good 
Water, of course, is not indivisible and public in the 
strictest sense, and a few scholars therefore have denied 
that it is a public good. (Anderson & Snyder, at 113-14; 
Harbison, at 546-47) But few things are strictly indivisible 
and public, which is why economists and philosophers often 
use something like nuclear deterrence as an example of a 
true public good. What a culture treats as a public good, 
however, is not determined just by its physical 
characteristics, but also by its social and economic 
characteristics. When the costs to exclude others would be 
so high that it is impractical, or when there are other 
(perhaps cultural) reasons why a society will not exclude 
some of its members from access, the good is treated as a 
public good. 
The most usual social or economic characteristic that 
leads to our treating something as a "public good" that is 
not strictly indivisible or public is that transaction costs are 
simply so high that no market can function with even 
minimal effectiveness. (Howe, Boggs, & Butler; Polinsky, 
at 12-14) Yet, most who advocate markets as management 
tools for raw water say little or nothing about transaction 
costs. Economist Ronald Coase has argued that economists 
who ignore transaction costs are practicing "blackboard 
economics." (Coase 1988, at 1-20) The most important and 
consistent simplifying assumption that most economists 
make is to assume a "frictionless market"—a market 
without transaction costs. Lawyers, on the other hand, 
focus precisely on the costs and frictions of the marketplace 
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for their role is to minimize, accommodate, or overcome 
such problems. Lawyers simply are not concerned about 
how ideal markets could function—except as a baseline for 
measuring the failures of real markets. 
Another reason for treating something as a public good 
is because society's values require that all receive a "fair" 
share of the resource. When transaction costs make markets 
impossible yet the good is perceived as essential for the 
minimum socially acceptable well-being of all members of 
society, society (today, usually the government) undertakes 
to provide the good to all without direct cost for the amount 
consumed. Such goods could be termed socially created 
public goods. Examples of socially created public goods 
include fire protection or public education, both of which 
are, in some settings, treated as private goods but today are 
generally made available to all by governments, at no direct 
cost to actual consumers. The status of socially created 
public goods changes through time. Thus, there now is a 
growing demand in some quarters to reprivatize education 
(through vouchers, for example). 
Water is just such a commodity. This is most obvious 
for the protection of instream flows. Less obvious, but no 
less true, is the public nature of water when withdrawn for 
private use. While it is easy enough for someone to own 
and manage water unilaterally in small amounts (for 
example, bottled water), a river is an ambient resource that 
can never be fully controlled or fully owned. Even building 
a dam only delays the flow of the water; it cannot stop the 
flow altogether. Thus doing something to water on a large 
scale necessarily affects many others, making it difficult to 
procure the assent of all significantly affected persons. 
Transaction costs on all but the smallest streams, lakes, or 
aquifers, quickly become prohibitive unless those "spill 
over" effects are ignored. It is this reality that underlies the 
tradition of treating water as a free good—a good available 
to all at no cost for the water itself, but only for the cost of 
capturing, transporting, and using the water. Advocates of 
private action as the prime means for protecting instream 
values simply miss the point. (Anderson & Snyder, at 114-
16; Kaiser & Binion, at 169-73) 
Water should not be a free good any longer. Economic 
incentives should be introduced for those who use water so 
they will more realistically evaluate the social 
consequences oftheir conduct. (Cummings & Nercissiantz) 
I cannot stress too strongly that economic incentives, 
including fees, taxes, and "water banks," undoubtedly are 
useful in managing public property. But resort to economic 
incentives should not obscure the fact that water remains 
the prime example of a public good for which prices cannot 
be set in a marketplace. 
PATTERNS OF PROPERTY IN WATER 
In all the world, there are just three basic approaches to 
property rights: (1) common property; (2) private property; 
and (3) public property. The paradigm of property in the 
common law remains the fee simple absolute. Even today, 
land can be marked off and considered for most purposes as 
the exclusive domain of a particular owner with little 
regard for the effects of the owner's conduct on others' 
persons or property—despite the law of nuisance and the 
modern law of zoning. Land, however, stays put within its 
boundaries. Flowing water, like any ambient resource, 
simply does not fit easily into such a paradigm. While 
considerable ink has been consumed in devising subtly 
varied versions of marketable water rights for the United 
States, no such scheme has ever actually been implemented. 
The major changes in private property rights in water have 
instead stressed the public nature of the resource and the 
limitations that public nature impose upon private rights. 
(American Society of Civil Engineers; Dellapenna 1991d) 
The three ideal models of property each correspond 
rather more closely than many realize to the three real 
world models of water law found today in the United 
States. Although there has been some convergence in recent 
years regarding state water laws in the states of the United 
States, the various states remain committed—in nearly 
equal numbers—to the three distinctly different approaches 
represented by these paradigms. The correspondence 
between modern forms of American water law and the 
several theoretical models of property types is more than a 
simple curiosity. The correspondence of forms of water law 
to theoretical models enables us to predict with some 
certainty whether existing forms are adaptable to changing 
circumstances, or whether an entirely new form must be 
substituted when circumstances of water demand or supply 
change dramatically. 
WHY COMMON PROPERTY SYSTEMS 
CANNOT SURVIVE 
Biologist Garrett Hardin explained more than thirty 
years ago, in his famous article on The Tragedy of the 
Commons, why a common property system can function 
only when the common pool resource is available in much 
greater supply than the demand for the resource. (Hardin) 
Whenever each common owner can decide for herself 
whether to increase her use of the resource regardless of the 
effect on other common owners (except for direct 
interference with the uses of the others), each owner will be 
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able to appropriate for herself the whole of each additional 
increment of use, while the whole group will share equally 
the cost imposed on the common resource. Hardin has been 
criticized, particularly by economists, as having over 
simplified the reality of how "commons" functioned in 
prior times or in remote areas. Hardin's critics have 
demonstrated that many such commons have functioned 
over extended periods quite satisfactorily even when close 
to the carrying capacity of the resource through informal 
regulations imposed by the small communities sharing a 
commons. (McCay & Acheson; Ostrom) The point is well 
taken, yet it is utterly irrelevant for describing how a 
"commons" works in a much larger society where, because 
most persons are strangers to each other, informal sanctions 
do not function effectively and formal law recognizes no 
real limits on any one person's exploitation of the 
commons. When the common owners are strangers to each 
other, as each user receives the full incremental value of the 
changes he induces while bearing only a small fraction of 
the costs, the only rational course for each common owner 
is to increase his uses until the resource is exhausted. This 
is more than a mere theoretical model. We have witnessed 
it over and over again in this century regarding common 
pool resources "governed" by the rule of common property. 
(Hardin & Baden) Hardin concluded that only a private 
property system, in which the costs as well as the benefits 
of resource management decisions are concentrated on the 
particular owner making the decision, could avoid the 
tragedy of the commons. 
Experience with riparian rights suggests an another 
feature of common pool resources. If exploitation of a 
common pool resource requires significant capital 
investment, the inability of potential investors to keep 
others from preempting an investor's uses will bring about 
under investment in the resource. (Rose 1986) This fear 
caused the rejection of riparian rights in the drier, western 
states of the United States in favor of an attempt at a sort of 
private property system such as Hardin would argue was 
necessary than a century later. (Coffin v. Left-Hand Ditch 
Co.; Dellapenna 1991c, §8.01) 
WHY PRIVATE PROPERTY SYSTEMS FAIL 
FOR WATER RESOURCES 
While the early history of water law in the eastern 
United States is not entirely clear, it appears that an earlier 
version of riparian rights, the "natural flow" theory, was 
once followed that was as clear and certain a system of 
property law as one could imagine. (Dellapenna 1991b, 
§7.02(c)) Under the natural flow theory, each riparian 
owner had an apparently unqualified right to have water  
flow down undiminished in quality and unchanged in 
quantity except insofar as upstream uses exploited the 
water source for strictly domestic uses. In the mid- to late-
nineteenth century the natural flow theory was replaced 
throughout the eastern United States with the modern 
"reasonable use" theory, which as we have noted is a 
common property system. (Dellapenna 1991b, §7.02(d)) 
Today, similar transitions are underway for groundwater 
and for diffused surface water. (Dellapenna 2000a, 
§10.03(b)(3); Murphy) Transitions from a private property 
system to a common property system are rare. The 
occurrence of such transitions for ambient resources like 
water suggests that, despite the asserted advantages of 
private property systems, such systems do not work well for 
such resources. 
Some scholars have described the earlier transition in 
the approach to riparian rights as a means for introducing 
flexible development into a capital poor and technologically 
backward, but resource rich, nineteenth-century America. 
(Abrams 1989a, at 1391-1400) The more recent transitions 
suggest that the problem is more basic than a mere lack of 
cash. Ronald Coase demonstrated that a private property or 
market system is the most efficient mechanism for 
allocating resources to particular uses when it does work, 
but that such systems fail if there are significant barriers to 
the functioning of a market. (Coase 1960) The fact that 
markets for water as such have never actually played much 
of a role even in such a paradigmatic private property 
system as appropriative rights is evidence that markets do 
not work well for ambient resources like water. Indeed, one 
might note that similarly meager results were realized from 
the effort to introduce "marketable emission allowances" 
in the Clean Air Act of 1990 in order to harness markets for 
improving air quality. (Drury et al.; Joskow & 
Schmalensee; van Egteren & Weber) 
Impediments to Markets for Water 
The explanation for the failure of markets in 
environmental contexts goes under the rather name of 
"externalities"—a use by one person affects the uses by 
many others, perhaps all others, and hence a significant 
change in any use infringes upon the interests of many other 
users. (Carter, Vaugh, & Scheuring) While it might 
theoretically be possible for a properly structured market 
for water that copes with all of these concerns, in any 
economically large or complex hydrologic system the 
difficulty and expense of structuring transactions (the 
problem of transaction costs) are a sufficient explanation of 
why real markets simply have never developed in practice, 
and do not appear likely to develop. (Colby; Kaiser, at 246-
56; McCormick) Only by disregarding all such extema- 
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lities do markets become possible. 
Under appropriative rights, water rights are defined in 
terms of an authorization to commit a specific quantity of 
water at a specific point at specific times for specific uses 
on specific land and with a specific (time-based) priority. 
The regime comes as close as one might hope to a true 
private property system of water rights. One might expect 
that such externalities would be less of a problem under 
appropriative rights because senior appropriators have 
superior rights to junior appropriators. The temporal 
priorities among water uses might lead one to expect that 
the law would routinely ignore externalities when the 
transfer is undertaken by a senior appropriator and 
externalities affects only junior appropriators. The law of 
appropriative rights, however, consistently prohibits even 
a senior appropriator from changing the time, place, or 
manner of use if the change would produce a significant 
injury to a junior appropriator. (Anderson 2000, § 
16.02(b); Gould; Kaiser, at 213-14, 246-47; MacDonnell 
& Rice, at 29-31; Mitchell; Williams) The burden of 
proving no injury to other users of water is on the one 
seeking to make the change, rather than on the one 
objecting to the change. If the evidence is inconclusive, a 
court will forbid the change. 
Precisely such uncertainty is usually the case if the 
question is what portion of the water diverted from the 
stream (the usual measure of the appropriative right) was 
consumptively used by the senior appropriator and what 
portion constituted a return flow to the benefit of junior 
appropriators. (Anderson 2000, § 16.02(b); Gould, at 25-
28) Indeed, the burden on applicant for a change of proving 
a negative—that there would be "no injury" to any other 
water user—often is a practical impossibility. While we 
can easily obtain exact measurements of return flows 
through "point sources" of discharge that characterize 
return flows from municipalities or industries, measuring 
return flows through "non-point sources"—as in 
agriculture—is far from easy and nearly always uncertain. 
Yet it is from agriculture that the proponents of markets 
seek to move water, not the other way around. (Anderson 
& Snyder; Israel & Lund; Kaiser, at 185-92; Kaiser & 
Binion; MacDonnell & Rice; Tarlock & Van de Wetering; 
Thompson; Wahl 1989, at 140-44; Weber 1990) As a 
result, a sale or lease of a water right can be blocked by 
any affected third party—including a junior 
appropriator—who is willing to seek an injunction. The 
transaction cannot take place unless all potentially affected 
holders of water rights have consented. Obtaining such 
consents will require contracts and compensation to be paid 
to all affected third parties. On even a moderately sized 
water source, the costs of identifying each affected water 
right holder and then securing the necessary consents will  
be prohibitively expensive. (Colby; Harbison, at 543-49; 
Howe, Boggs, & Butler; Lund) 
The classic example of what happens when a buyer 
seeks water for a use that is fundamentally different or at a 
considerable remove from that of the seller is the case of 
City of Denver v. Fulton Irrigating Ditch Company. The 
City of Denver sought to trade its sewage water for Coors 
brewery's "clear mountain stream." Denver would take 
Coors' clear mountain stream to augment its municipal 
supplies; Coors would have the right to use unlimited 
quantities of Denver sewage water for making beer. The 
transaction failed not because of fears over possible 
outrage on the part of beer drinkers, but because a group of 
farmers downstream from Denver (organized as the Fulton 
Irrigating Ditch Co.) obtained an injunction against this 
trade because it would deprive them of the water on which 
they were relying. (Williams, at 311-21) 
The law of appropriative rights does not go as far as 
it might in inhibiting transfers of water to new uses. For 
one thing, only the rights of other appropriators are 
protected. Generalized social costs, such as the loss of tax 
revenues to a community, are not protected from the effects 
of transfers. (Anderson 2000, § 16.02(b); Gomez & Loh; 
Kaiser, at 219-222, 248-29; MacDonnell & Rice, at 31-34, 
53-54; Oggins & Ingram; Tarlock & Van de Wetering, at 
177-79, 183-85; Weber 1990) Concern over generalized 
social costs have generated enough political pressure to 
bring about the enactment of "area-of-origin" statutes. 
(Anderson 2000, § 16.02(c)(2); Kaiser, at 215-18, 251-53; 
Weber 1994) Area-of-origin statutes have not been 
significant barriers to market transactions only because the 
law protecting the rights of junior appropriators provides so 
much deterrence to market transactions that it really does 
not matter much whether social costs are ignored or 
considered. 
Economists and others who champion the free play of the 
market have insisted that the protection of third-party rights 
represents an overly rigid legal regime. (Kaiser, at 214; 
McCormick) If only such requirements were removed, 
markets would flourish. This mischaracterizes the situation. 
Area-of-origin statutes are regulations that have the 
potential to interfere with or to prevent market transactions. 
The protection of third-party rights operate differently. 
Such protections prevent market-generated externalities 
from destroying the property rights of third parties. Rather 
than representing government intervention that prevents or 
distorts markets, such protections are the minimum that is 
necessary to assure that property rights—each person's 
property rights—are transferred only through markets. 
(Jordan) 
Once one realizes how the law affects the possibility of 
sales of water rights, one readily grasps why small-scale 
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transfers of water rights among farmers or ranchers—all of 
whom are making roughly similar uses at more or less the 
same place—are the only ones that regularly occurred 
without state intervention. (Anderson 2000, §§ 16.04(c)(2) 
to § 16.02(c)(5); Thompson at 708-23; Wahl 1989, at 133-
40; Young) For small-scale, like-kind transactions, there is 
little likelihood of effects on third parties. The only large-
scale transactions involving a significant change in the 
place or manner of use and achieved purely by market 
transactions have been in situations where the transferor 
was the last beneficial user of the water. The prime 
example is the transfer of water from the Imperial Irrigation 
District in southern California to the Metropolitan Water 
District or the San Diego County Water Authority serving 
the urban conglomerates of southern California. 
(MacDonnell & Rice, at 37-38; Wahl 1994, at 51-52.) In 
that context, if the transferred water were not conserved by 
the irrigation district and conveyed to the water district it 
would have passed into the increasingly saline and 
increasingly polluted Salton Sea which will not even 
sustain wildlife. Even so, the transactions evoked strong, 
but unavailing resistance from local communities that 
feared the ensuing fallowing of land would injure their 
economic base and from other irrigation districts who 
contended that the salved water should have gone to them 
without charge notwithstanding that they did not benefit 
from any relevant return flow. 
Besides economic efficiency, another issue needs to be 
considered—namely, distributive equity—although 
economists often are uncomfortable discussing it. (Ferber 
& Nelson; Korobkin & Ulen; Polinsky, at 7-10, 119-27; 
Posner 1980; Shaven) In the nineteenth century, with 
limited and ineffective government in the United States, a 
transition from a private property system (which had the 
effect of freezing uses rather than of creating a market) to 
a common property system introduced a measure of flexi-
bility into the possible uses and thereby promoted social 
and economic development. (Abrams 1989a, at 1392-96) 
The transition from private property to common property 
also, whether intended or not, worked a massive and 
continuing, if haphazard, wealth redistribution. (Abrams 
1989a, at 1394; Chinn; Heller) Generally, wealth is 
transferred from the poorest users of water (who hold the 
smallest water rights or no water right at all, and in either 
case are unattractive to potential buyers) to the wealthier 
members of society—those who can afford to buy water 
rights but need no longer worry about compensating the 
small water users who loose their expected return flows. 
(Bauer; Easter & Hearne) Today, the transition to a 
common property system seems much less prudent as 
demand for water outstrip supplies, creating a real risk of 
the tragedy of the commons for those parts of the United 
States that follow traditional riparian rights. The probably 
regressive distributive effects on the allocation of water 
rights ought to make one wary of any such transition in 
today's world. 
The California Water Bank 
California, facing a five-year long drought in the late 1980s 
and early 1990s, sought to transfer water from low-valued 
agricultural uses to higher valued urban uses. California is 
a dual system state that still recognizes riparian rights to 
some extent even while placing dominant emphasis on 
appropriative rights. (Dellapenna 1991c) California did not 
attempt to enforce the common property principles already 
in place or to replace its private property principles in its 
version of appropriative rights with a common property 
system. Instead, the state set about to create something the 
state and many commentators have termed a "market" 
where none had existed before through an institution called 
the "California water bank." (Gray; Israel & Lund; 
MacDonnell & Rice, at 46, 52-53; O'Brien & Gunning; 
Wahl 1994, at 49-50) 
One must use considerable care in discussing "water 
banks" for the phrase is used in widely differing senses in 
the several states in which "water banks" have been 
created. (Anderson 2000, § 16.04(c)(2); Kaiser, at 201-03) 
The California Water Bank functioned as a mechanism for 
facilitating the movement of water out of agriculture in 
order to serve the far more numerous voters in northern 
California cities. The California Water Bank itself was a 
rather piddling affair by California standards, involving in 
its peak year (1992) some 400,000 acre-feet when the 
state's shortfall alone exceeded 6,000,000 acre-feet. 
Furthermore, the California Water Bank was a most 
peculiar "market." For the 350 persons who were willing  
to sell water rights, the state was the only buyer, while for 
the 20 institutions willing to buy water rights the state was 
the only seller. The state of California as buyer or seller 
also had an inestimable advantage over private buyers or 
sellers for California decided that when it buys or sells 
water rights it need not concern itself with the effects on 
third parties, even if the affected third parties hold valid 
water rights. (Wahl 1994, at 58-60) No private buyer or 
seller would have been allowed to ignore the spill-over 
effects on third parties. (O'Brien & Gunning, at 1062-74) 
The California Water Bank's prices ($125/ac-ft. to 
sellers, as much as $400/ac-ft. to buyers) can hardly be 
described as having resulted from the market place. The 
state chose to whom it would sell, setting the prices by 
administrative fiat. (Gray, at 21-24; MacDonnell & Rice, 
at 46-47; O'Brien & Gunning, at 1095; Wahl 1994, at 58-
60) As a result, some 70 percent of the water made 
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available through the water bank went to just three urban 
water providers. That this was not really a set of market 
transactions is particularly underscored when the state 
implicitly (and sometimes explicitly) underscored its 
"offers" to buy with the threat of condemnation. 
Rather than being an example of a market, the 
California Water Bank was an instance of state 
management hiding behind the facade of a market. The 
state applied economic incentives to encourage private (and 
public) actors to comply with the state's policy choices 
while disregarding the effects of the state's actions on other 
private (or public) actors whose claims would preclude the 
accomplishment of the state's goals. Flexibility was 
introduced to enable fundamental transformation of water 
uses within the state and (incidentally) wealth was 
transferred from those who formerly used water to those 
who thereafter would use water. (Dixon et al.; Harbison, at 
553-59; O'Brien & Gunning, at 1078-83) Specifically, the 
California Water Bank transferred wealth from relatively 
small, poor farmers to relatively wealthier middle class 
urban dwellers. These may very well be laudable goals in 
California in the late twentieth century, although 
considerable evidence suggests that when it comes to water 
equity is more important to society than efficiency. (Howe) 
THE PUBLIC PROPERTY OPTION 
Unlike the nineteenth century, when the eastern and 
western states moved in very different directions to escape 
the strictures of the "natural flow" version of riparian 
rights, both eastern and western states today increasingly 
turning are to active public management of water resources. 
The states of the United States that have adapted a public 
property approach for water management have determined 
that a transition to public property appears to offer 
significant advantages over both common property and 
private property in terms of efficient allocation of the 
resource and in terms distributive justice. (Freyfogle) 
Public Property Distinguished from Common Property 
Unquestionably there are considerable difficulties in 
defining appropriate public goals or in making the right 
decisions to achieve those goals. (Farber; M' Gonigle) Over 
the past 50 years, about half of the states that formerly 
followed the common property approach of riparian rights 
have changed to a system of public property now coming to 
be called "regulated riparianism." (Dellapenna 1991c) 
Perhaps the leading example of such a system available 
today is the Regulated Riparian Model Water Code of by 
the American Society of Civil Engineers. (American 
Society of Civil Engineers) While the details of these new 
systems are vary more highly than the administrative 
systems under appropriative rights, there is a common core 
to the new systems that enables us to describe the systems 
as they appear to be evolving. The most fundamental 
departure from common law riparian rights in regulated 
riparian statutes is the requirement that, with few 
exceptions, water cannot legally be withdrawn from a 
watersource except pursuant to a time-limited permit issued 
by the state in which the withdrawal occurs. The rights of 
water users are determined by the permits, not by the 
riparian nature of a use. The "riparian" element comes 
from the criterion by which permit applications are judged, 
namely whether the proposed use is "reasonable." 
Nonetheless, the criterion of "reasonable use" is applied 
very differently than at common law. An administering 
agency decides before a use begins whether a use is rea-
sonable, both in terms of general social policy and in terms 
of the effects of the proposed use on other permitted uses. 
If the decision-making process were to continue to be a 
crisis-response process that comes into play only after 
significant interference arises between competing uses, the 
regulated riparian statutes could be indicted for the same 
faults that have bedeviled common law riparian rights. The 
regulated riparian statutes, however, all provide a process 
whereby the decision whether a proposed use is reasonable 
is made before investment in the use takes place through 
the issuance or denial of a permit. The existence of the 
permit process thus fundamentally transforms the operation 
of the concept of "reasonableness" from that known under 
traditional riparian rights. Such an ambitious program of 
public management might very well fall short of the goals 
set for it. It could be improved by the introduction of 
various economic incentives as part of the public 
management scheme—but one simply should not confuse 
economic incentives with markets. 
Even with economic incentives, the enterprise of moving 
fundamental decisions concerning the use of water by 
private parties from the actors involved into the hands of 
experts working in an administrative agency poses daunting 
challenges to those charged with responsibility for 
administering the program. Administration of the public 
property system will be less than perfect. Whether the 
resulting permit process is superior to either traditional 
riparian rights, to appropriative rights, to a purely market 
system, or to some other regulatory system has been, and 
continues to be, hotly debated. (Abrams 1989b; Abrams 
1990; Chinn; Dellapenna 1991c, §9.03(a)(5)(D); Korobkin 
& Ulen; Rose 1990) How one resolves these questions is 
largely a function of how much confidence one has in the 
ability of a bureaucratic structure to manage a common 
pool resource compared to the alternatives. (Cole; Esty; 
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Rose 1994) 
Economists who the proposition that markets, like 
governments, do fail are forced to introduce "invisible, 
indeterminate, (heaven forbid) soft factors" to explain why 
actors in the market place do not behave in ways that 
economic theory predicts. (Lubet) This simply will not do. 
To suggest that the sellers of strawberries, for example, 
who refuse to lower their price to clear their shelves rather 
than see the strawberries spoil over night have a 
predilection for rotten strawberries simply does nothing but 
reduce economic theory to meaningless circularity. When 
we fmd that even among Bedouin horse dealers, markets 
can simply fail to reach the most economically efficient 
outcome, we must begin to question when markets can be 
expected to achieve the most socially desirable outcome 
even if we define "most socially desirable" in the narrowest 
of economic terms. In the context of water management, 
one cannot have much confidence in a more purely market 
system given the scarcity of actual empirical experience 
with such a system and giyen the enormous complexities of 
transaction costs and externalities present as barriers to a 
successful market for water rights. As for any 
hypothetically new model beyond those considered in this 
article, one hardly knows were to begin. 
In the eastern United States, the problem of riparian 
rights as vested property rights in a mature economic 
system is likely, as a practical matter, to preclude recourse 
to appropriative rights rather than regulated riparianism. 
(Dellapenna 1991c, §8.05) Because of the growing 
shortages of water relative to demand in most eastern 
states, the trend towards regulated riparianism is likely to 
strengthen because the system has at least three 
demonstrable advantages over traditional riparian rights. 
So long as water is treated as a common pool resource, we 
face the "tragedy of the commons"; only active public 
management can avoid the utter destruction of the resource. 
(Dellapenna 1991 a, §6. 01 (b); Hardin) Furthermore, having 
a permit in advance of investment provides the security of 
right, so lacking under common law riparian rights, 
necessary for intelligent planning or investment decisions. 
(Abrams 1990; Dellapenna 1991b, §§7.02(d)(3), 7.03; 
Dellapenna 1991d, §9.01; Freyfogle) Finally, 
comprehensive planning under regulated riparianism 
enables problems to be dealt with more rationally by 
creating the possibility that a problem will be recognized 
and responded to before it becomes a crisis. (Dellapenna 
1991d, §9.05(a), 9.05(d)) 
Is Public Management Worth the Cost? 
Accepting the public managerial impulse has, of course, 
substantial costs, both in terms of money and in terms of  
the risk of poor decisions by the managers. The question is 
not, however, whether a public property system creates an 
ideal model of water allocation, but whether it creates a 
better model for water allocation than is otherwise 
available. (Robinson) The rarity of markets for water rights 
and the deficiencies of either common property or private 
property systems in water suggest that the allocation of 
water is not particularly efficient under those models either. 
(Duxbury) The loss in efficiency, if any, from adopting 
public property system is not likely to be high, and might 
well prove to be a gain. hi fact, the attempt to rely on 
private property concepts as the primary means for 
managing water as a resource has resulted in freezing uses 
in the pattern of their first use long after those uses have 
become relatively uneconomic rather than opening up a 
path to relatively easy transfer from less valuable uses to 
more valuable uses. Thus, while one would be hard pressed 
to prove whether treating water as private property or as 
public property was more likely to result in the econom-
ically efficient use of the resource, water is a resource 
where privatization and markets are not likely to promote 
the economically efficiency use of the resource. Concerns 
about distributional equity just might tip the scales. 
The problem of using water management to further social 
justice while preventing too much power from accumulating 
in the hands of an unelected elite is, of course, part of the 
central political problem of our time in the face of 
increasingly administrative states. (Dempsey) Like the 
problem of efficiency, there is no easy or certain means of 
resolving the problem. In short, there is no clear answer to 
whether public property system is worth the cost, or 
whether a private property system would work better or at 
less cost. I would simply caution one to examine carefully 
whether the actual experience of water markets suggests 
that such a system is workable; if not, one is left with little 
else than to attempt to make a public property system work 
effectively and equitably, partly through recourse to 
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